Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103577
 
 

Citations



 


 



International Water Transfer and Sharing: The Case of the Ganges River


Anik Bhaduri


International Water Management Institute

Edward B. Barbier


University of Wyoming - College of Business - Department of Economics and Finance


Environment and Development Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 29-51, 2008

Abstract:     
The following paper is concerned with water sharing of the Ganges River between India and Bangladesh, with possible augmentation through water transfers from Nepal. We analyzed the case when water from Nepal can be transferred to Bangladesh through the upstream country, India, as the local geography only permits such water transfer. A game theoretic model is formulated to determine the optimal share of water diverted to Bangladesh by India, and the optimal amount of water transfer from Nepal. India may gain positive externalities from such water transfer. The positive externalities generated from water transfer from Nepal may influence the water share of both India and Bangladesh. In the absence of altruism, India would allow less water flow to Bangladesh than in the case when there is no provision to buy water from Nepal. We also explored whether positive externalities could induce India to buy water jointly with Bangladesh, and such a case will only occur if the countries possess altruistic concerns and share water according to an agreement.

Accepted Paper Series





Not Available For Download

Date posted: March 11, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Bhaduri, Anik and Barbier, Edward B., International Water Transfer and Sharing: The Case of the Ganges River. Environment and Development Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 29-51, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103577

Contact Information

Anik Bhaduri (Contact Author)
International Water Management Institute ( email )
2nd Floor, Office Block B
NASC Complex, DPS Marg,
Pusa, New Delhi, 110 012
India
+91-11 25840811 (Phone)
Edward B. Barbier
University of Wyoming - College of Business - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )
Dept. 3985
COB, 1000 E. University Ave.
Laramie, WY 82071
United States
307-766-2358 (Phone)
307-766-5090 (Fax)
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