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Statistics on Modern Private International Cartels, 1990-2005

John M. Connor
Purdue University; American Antitrust Institute (AAI)

C. Gustav Helmers
Purdue University


January 10, 2007

American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No. 07-01

Abstract:     
This report explains the principal economic and legal features of a unique set of data on 283 modern private international cartels discovered anywhere in the world from January 1990 to the end of 2005. Measured in real 2005 money, aggregate cartel sales and overcharges totaled about $1.2 trillion and $300 billion, respectively. In the early 2000s, about 35 such cartels were discovered each year. We find that global cartels comprise more than half of the sample's affected sales and are larger, longer lasting, and more injurious than other types. In the early 2000s world-wide corporate penalties stabilized at or above $2 billion per year, one-thousand times penalties in the early 1990s. More than 40% of those penalties were from settlements in private suits, and most of the rest are fines imposed by U.S. and EU antitrust authorities. Median penalties are low: from 1.4% to 4.9% of affected sales, depending on the type of prosecution. As a proportion of damages, median fines ranged from less than 1% for EU-wide cartels to 17.6% for Canada. Private plaintiffs obtained 38% of damages from international cartelists. World wide, median real cartel penalties of all types amounted to less than 21% of overcharges.

Keywords: cartel, price fixing, overcharge, antitrust enforcement, optimal deterrence

Working Paper Series

Date posted: March 11, 2008 ; Last revised: March 11, 2008

Suggested Citation

Connor, John M. and Helmers, C. Gustav, Statistics on Modern Private International Cartels, 1990-2005 (January 10, 2007). American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No. 07-01. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103610


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Contact Information

John M. Connor (Contact Author)
Purdue University ( email )
403 W. State St.
West Lafayette, IN 47907-2056
United States
7654944260 (Phone)
7654949176 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.purdue.edu/staff/facindex.asp
American Antitrust Institute (AAI)
2919 Ellicott Street, N.W.
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20008-1022
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.antitrustinstitute.com
C. Gustav Helmers
Purdue University ( email )
Department of Agricultural Economics
West Lafayette, IN 47907
United States
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