The Wreckage of Recklessness
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp
University of Toledo College of Law
Washington University Law Review, Vol. 86, 2008
"Recklessness" is one of the oldest concepts in Anglo-American tort law, but also one of the most poorly understood. Often identified as a tort falling somewhere between negligence and intentional misconduct, recklessness has evaded precise judicial interpretation for two hundred years. The Restatement of Torts defines recklessness as conscious disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm, but courts have been unable to interpret consistently the key elements of this definition. This Article suggests that judicial confusion is not simply the product of linguistic imprecision on the part of the ALI. Rather, the Restatement version of recklessness is inconsistent with the actual behavioral and cognitive processes humans employ in the face of risk and uncertainty. Recent work in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics indicates that individuals fail to process risk in the way the black-letter-law definition of recklessness presumes, and calls into question the degree to which decisions can easily be classified as conscious or unconscious. Rather than continue to struggle to add clarity to an already convoluted articulation of doctrine, law reformers should reconceptualize the tort concept of recklessness not in terms of what it is, but in terms of what it does: allow a particular plaintiff to recover for a defendant's carelessness where ordinary negligence doctrine would bar relief.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 70
Keywords: Torts, Recklessness, Cognitive Psychology, Neuroscience, Neuroeconomics, Rationality, Behavioral Law and Economics
JEL Classification: D81, D89, K00, K13Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: March 13, 2008 ; Last revised: June 19, 2009
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