What is Missed if We Leave Out Collective Choice in the Analysis of Taxation
Stanley L. Winer
Carleton University - School of Public Policy and Administration; Carleton University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); International Centre for Economic Research (ICER)
Walter Hettich
California State University, Fullerton - Department of Economics
National Tax Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2, June 1998
Abstract:
Omission of collective choice prevents the analyst from understanding the central role of political equilibrium. To create a framework that places tax policies in a broader equilibrium context, we must model the underlying collective allocation mechanism and use it as a starting point, whether we do empirical work explaining observed features of tax systems, or whether we engage in research on tax efficiency. A broader perspective of this nature also forces us to re-examine well-known concepts, such as tax expenditures, flat taxation and the marginal efficiency cost of public funds, and to question and re-interpret some of the conclusions that have been reached in the literature related to these concepts.
JEL Classification: D7, H1, H2, H3
Accepted Paper Series
Suggested Citation
Winer, Stanley L. and Hettich, Walter, What is Missed if We Leave Out Collective Choice in the Analysis of Taxation. National Tax Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2, June 1998. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=110768
