Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1107801
 
 

References (41)



 
 

Citations (5)



 


 



Contract Enforcement, Institutions and Social Capital: The Maghribi Traders Reappraised


Jeremy Edwards


University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics and Politics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Sheilagh Ogilvie


University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

March 2008

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2254

Abstract:     
Economists draw important lessons for modern development from the medieval Maghribi traders who, according to Greif, enforced contracts multilaterally through a closed, private-order 'coalition'. We show that this view is untenable. The Maghribis used formal legal mechanisms and entered business associations with non-Maghribis. Not a single empirical example adduced by Greif shows that any 'coalition' actually existed. The Maghribis cannot be used to argue that the social capital of exclusive networks will facilitate exchange in developing economies. Nor do they provide any support for the cultural theories of economic development and institutional change for which they have been mobilised.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 54

Keywords: contract enforcement, reputation, legal system, social network

JEL Classification: O17

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: March 19, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Edwards, Jeremy and Ogilvie, Sheilagh, Contract Enforcement, Institutions and Social Capital: The Maghribi Traders Reappraised (March 2008). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2254. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1107801

Contact Information

Jeremy Edwards (Contact Author)
University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics and Politics ( email )
Austin Robinson Building
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge, CB3 9DD
United Kingdom
++44 1223 335232 (Phone)
++44 1223 335475 (Fax)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
Sheilagh Ogilvie
University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics ( email )
Austin Robinson Building
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge, CB3 9DD
United Kingdom
44-1223-335200 (Phone)
44-1223-335475 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/faculty/ogilvie/index.htm
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 5,749
Downloads: 1,489
Download Rank: 6,015
References:  41
Citations:  5

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.266 seconds