Are All Inside Directors the Same? Evidence from the External Directorship Market.

Abstract:     
Agency theory and optimal contracting theory posit opposing roles and shareholder wealth effects for corporate inside directors. We evaluate these competing theories using the labor market for outside directorships to differentiate inside directors. Firms with inside directors holding outside directorships have better operating performance and market-to-book ratios, especially when board monitoring is more difficult. These boards make better acquisition decisions, have greater cash-holdings and overstate earnings less often. Announcements of outside board appointments improve shareholder wealth, while departure announcements reduce it, consistent with these inside directors improving board performance and outside directorships being an important source of inside director incentives.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 90

Keywords: board of directors, inside directors, independent directors, corporate governance, manager entrenchment

JEL Classification: G34, D23

Accepted Paper Series