The Economic Consequences of Perk Disclosure
Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management; Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah
University of Texas at Dallas - Department of Accounting & Information Management
April 1, 2011
Johnson School Research Paper Series No. 06-2011
AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper
In December 2006 the SEC issued rules that require enhanced disclosure of perquisites to managers of public U.S. firms. We find that the new disclosures had a significant effect of on shareholder value and perk practices. Firms that disclose perks for the first time in response to the rules experience significantly negative returns around the disclosure date. These firms respond to the negative returns by decreasing perk levels in the subsequent year. Firms that were already disclosing perks before the rule ratchet-up the level of perks in the subsequent year. Further, using data collected under the new disclosure regime, the level of perks is higher in firms that have fewer growth opportunities, larger amounts of free cash flow, managers with more power over the board of directors, and in firms that operate in more concentrated industries.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 55
Keywords: CEO Compensation, Perks
JEL Classification: G12, G34, G38, J33, M41, M45
Date posted: March 19, 2008 ; Last revised: April 4, 2015
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.266 seconds