Pay for Performance? CEO Compensation and Acquirer Returns in BHCs
University of Maryland, R. H. Smith School of Business
University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business
January 30, 2010
We examine the impact of managerial incentives on acquisitions in the banking industry. We find that banks whose CEOs have higher pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) are less likely to engage in value-reducing acquisitions. Conditional on engaging in acquisitions, those higher-PPS banks have significantly better announcement returns: on average these banks outperform the acquirers in the lower-PPS group by $1.4% in a three-day window around the announcement. The positive market reaction can be rationalized by long-term performance. Following acquisitions, banks with high PPS experience greater improvement in their operating performance as measured by ROA.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 39
Keywords: Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity, CEO Compensation, Acquirer Returns
JEL Classification: G34, G21
Date posted: March 25, 2008 ; Last revised: September 14, 2014
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 1.515 seconds