Does the Market for CEO Talent Explain Controversial CEO Pay Practices?
University of Notre Dame
Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management
May 21, 2013
forthcoming in the Review of Finance
Benchmarking, pay for luck, and the large compensation packages given to CEOs in recent years are three major controversial compensation practices. We examine the extent to which variation in the market for CEO talent explains these practices. We find that CEO compensation is benchmarked against other firms only in industries where CEO talent is not firm-specific, and that pay for luck is more prevalent there also. These findings are consistent with theories based on the market for CEO talent. However, CEO compensation levels do not depend on whether CEO talent is firm-specific, which seems inconsistent with the talent competition argument.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 55
Keywords: CEO Compensation, talent, Skills, CEO Turnover
JEL Classification: J33Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: March 26, 2008
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.234 seconds