|
|
|
|
||||
|
||||
Disclosure and Agency Conflict in Delegated Investment Management: Evidence from Mutual Fund Commission BundlingRoger M. EdelenUniversity of California, Davis - Graduate School of Management Richard B. EvansUniversity of Virginia - Darden School of Business Gregory B. KadlecVirginia Polytechnic Institute & State University - Pamplin College of Business February 1, 2011 AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper Abstract: This study provides empirical evidence on the role of disclosure in resolving agency conflicts in delegated investment management. For certain expenditures fund managers have alternative means of payment which differ greatly in their opacity: payments can be expensed (relatively transparent); or bundled with brokerage commissions (relatively opaque). We find that the return impact of opaque payments is significantly more negative than that of transparent payments. Moreover, we find a differential flow reaction that confirms the opacity of commission bundling. Collectively, our results demonstrate the importance of transparency in addressing agency costs of delegated investment management.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 48 Keywords: Agency Conflict, Mutual Fund; Performance; Brokerage Commissions; Expenses. JEL Classification: G24, G29 working papers seriesDate posted: March 26, 2008 ; Last revised: May 15, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.485 seconds
