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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108813
 
 

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Convictions Versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor's Choice


J. Mark Ramseyer


Harvard Law School

Eric Bennett Rasmusen


Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy

Manu Raghav


Depauw University - Department of Economics and Management

March 2008

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 611

Abstract:     
It is natural to suppose that a prosecutor's conviction rate - the ratio of convictions to cases prosecuted - is a sign of his competence. Prosecutors, however, choose which cases to prosecute. If they prosecute only the strongest cases, they will have high conviction rates. Any system which pays attention to conviction rates, as opposed to the number of convictions, is liable to abuse. As a prosecutor's budget increases, he allocates it between prosecuting more cases and putting more effort into existing cases. Either can be socially desirable, depending on particular circumstances. We model the tradeoffs theoretically in two models, one of a benevolent social planner and one of a prosecutor rewarded directly for his conviction rate as well as caring about convictions and personal goals. We also look at anecdotal evidence from Japan and detailed U.S. data drawn from county-level crime statistics and a survey of all state prosecutors by district. We find that prosecution rates vary little with budget, but conviction rates do increase, and that the conviction rate declines in the number of cases prosecuted and with the crime rate of a district.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

JEL Classification: K14, K42

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Date posted: March 20, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Ramseyer, J. Mark and Rasmusen, Eric Bennett and Raghav, Manu, Convictions Versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor's Choice (March 2008). Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 611. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108813 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1108813

Contact Information

J. Mark Ramseyer (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 406
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-4878 (Phone)
617-496-6118 (Fax)
Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy ( email )
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Bloomington, IN Enter your state here 47405
United States
812-855-9219 (Phone)
812-855-3354 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://rasmusen.org

Manu Raghav
Depauw University - Department of Economics and Management ( email )
Greencastle, IN 46135
United States
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