The Economic Theory of Nuisance Law and Implications for Environmental Regulation
Keith N. Hylton
William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University; Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law
Case Western Reserve Law Review, 2008
Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 08-13
I explore the economic structure of nuisance law as a mechanism for regulating environmental interferences and propose a modernized enforcement regime. The modern regime would retain public enforcement primarily in identifying environmental harms and as a backstop for private enforcement.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 28
Keywords: economic structure of nuisance law, nuisance law, environmental regulation, command and control rules, liability rules, public enforcement, private enforcement, decentralization inefficiencies, agency cost problems, cost-benefit balancing of the common law
JEL Classification: K00, K13, K32, K41Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: March 24, 2008 ; Last revised: May 15, 2008
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