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The Economic Theory of Nuisance Law and Implications for Environmental Regulation


Keith N. Hylton


Boston University


Case Western Reserve Law Review, 2008
Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 08-13

Abstract:     
I explore the economic structure of nuisance law as a mechanism for regulating environmental interferences and propose a modernized enforcement regime. The modern regime would retain public enforcement primarily in identifying environmental harms and as a backstop for private enforcement.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: economic structure of nuisance law, nuisance law, environmental regulation, command and control rules, liability rules, public enforcement, private enforcement, decentralization inefficiencies, agency cost problems, cost-benefit balancing of the common law

JEL Classification: K00, K13, K32, K41

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Date posted: March 24, 2008 ; Last revised: May 15, 2008

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N., The Economic Theory of Nuisance Law and Implications for Environmental Regulation. Case Western Reserve Law Review, 2008; Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 08-13. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1112631

Contact Information

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)
Boston University ( email )
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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