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The WTO and Global Governance: The Case for Contractual Treaty Regimes


J. Patrick Kelly


Widener University - School of Law

January 1, 2001

Widener Law Symposium Journal, Vol. 7, 2001

Abstract:     
This article argues that the Appellate Body should interpret the WTO agreements narrowly as a self-contained, contractual regime limited to interstitial interpretations. Claims that the trade regime is subject to modifications by controversial customary international legal norms or should be interpreted in a teleological manner are inconsistent with the Dispute Settlement Understanding and state consent.

Unilateral trade sanctions to advance preferred environmental and social policies are, in most cases, the wrong solution for underlying problems of poverty, poor governance, and inadequate public investment. Policies that encourage economic development and a market-based economy enhance civil society and create public demand for a better environment.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: World Trade Organization, trade, international law theory, dispute resolution, social policy, trade and environment, WTO Appellate Body

JEL Classification: K32, K33

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Date posted: March 27, 2008 ; Last revised: October 27, 2008

Suggested Citation

Kelly, J. Patrick, The WTO and Global Governance: The Case for Contractual Treaty Regimes (January 1, 2001). Widener Law Symposium Journal, Vol. 7, 2001. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1112688

Contact Information

J. Patrick Kelly (Contact Author)
Widener University - School of Law ( email )
4601 Concord Pike
P.O. Box 7286
Wilmington, DE 19803-0474
United States
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