The Effects of Information Disclosure and Board Independence on IPO Discount
American University of Beirut - School of Business
City University London - Sir John Cass Business School
Journal of Small Business Management, Vol. 46, Issue 2, pp. 219-241, April 2008
This paper examines the effect of strategic information disclosure and corporate governance on the stock market performance of initial public offering (IPO) firms in France. It argues that information disclosure and board independence mitigate agency problems between the IPO firm and investors, thus reducing the IPO discount defined as the difference between the offer price and the intrinsic value of the firm. However, extensive disclosure may damage the firm's competitive advantage and lead to a curvilinear (an inverted U-shape) relationship between information disclosure and the IPO discount. Further analysis suggests that it is not necessarily the quantity of information, but rather the type of information, that causes the IPO discount to increase with the amount of disclosure.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 23Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: March 31, 2008
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