Expressive Law and Economics

University of Munich, Center for Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 161

32 Pages Posted: 13 Sep 1998

See all articles by Robert D. Cooter

Robert D. Cooter

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

Date Written: April 1998

Abstract

This article develops an economic theory of expressive law. By expressing social values, law can tip a system of social norms into a new equilibrium. This process can create or destroy a social norm without changing individual values. In addition, law can change the individual values of rational people. Internalizing a social norm is a moral commitment that attaches a psychological penalty to a forbidden act. A rational person internalizes a norm when commitment conveys an advantage relative to the original preferences and the changed preferences. I call such a commitment a Pareto self-improvement. By creating opportunities for Pareto self-improvements, law induces rational people to change their preferences. Inducing change in this way respects individual preferences, rather favoring a particular moral theory.

Suggested Citation

Cooter, Robert D., Expressive Law and Economics (April 1998). University of Munich, Center for Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 161, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=111408 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.111408

Robert D. Cooter (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
510-642-0503 (Phone)
510-642-3767 (Fax)

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