Performance Measurement under Rational International Overpromising Regimes
George M. Von Furstenberg
April 2, 2008
CAEPR Working Paper No. 2008-005
Overpromising remains ingrained in international agreements, clouding their expected aggregate outcomes and how to assess the Parties' performance. This paper provides a theory-based explanation and evaluation of this regime and its consequences, with an empirical application to the Kyoto Protocol. It shows (1) overpromising to be part of a sustainable strategy for electoral success, and (2) there are common determinants of the countries' overpromising values that characterize the group regime. (3) Targets need to be adjusted for regression-predicted overpromising to yield rationally-expected outcomes. (4) Individual countries' performance is best identified by deviations of outcomes from their adjusted, not the agreed, targets.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 40
Keywords: Overpromising, international agreements, treaty compliance, performance measurement, politics and environment, Kyoto Protocol
JEL Classification: F53, Q54, D72working papers series
Date posted: April 7, 2008
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