Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1116255
 


 



Performance Measurement under Rational International Overpromising Regimes


George M. Von Furstenberg


Indiana University

April 2, 2008

CAEPR Working Paper No. 2008-005

Abstract:     
Overpromising remains ingrained in international agreements, clouding their expected aggregate outcomes and how to assess the Parties' performance. This paper provides a theory-based explanation and evaluation of this regime and its consequences, with an empirical application to the Kyoto Protocol. It shows (1) overpromising to be part of a sustainable strategy for electoral success, and (2) there are common determinants of the countries' overpromising values that characterize the group regime. (3) Targets need to be adjusted for regression-predicted overpromising to yield rationally-expected outcomes. (4) Individual countries' performance is best identified by deviations of outcomes from their adjusted, not the agreed, targets.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: Overpromising, international agreements, treaty compliance, performance measurement, politics and environment, Kyoto Protocol

JEL Classification: F53, Q54, D72

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Date posted: April 7, 2008  

Suggested Citation

von Furstenberg, George M., Performance Measurement under Rational International Overpromising Regimes (April 2, 2008). CAEPR Working Paper No. 2008-005. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1116255 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1116255

Contact Information

Center for Applied Economics And Policy Research (Contact Author)
Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Economics
Bloomington, IN 47405-6620
United States
George M. Von Furstenberg
Indiana University ( email )
Department of Economics
Wylie Hall, Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47405-6620
United States
812-856-1382 (Phone)
812-855-3736 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://mypage.iu.edu/~vonfurst/

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