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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1116545
 
 

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Cardinal Voting: The Way to Escape the Social Choice Impossibility


Sergei Vasiljev


affiliation not provided to SSRN

April 1, 2008


Abstract:     
In the article it is called the universality of the ordinal theory of social choice in question. It is shown that a voting exists that cannot be described on the base of ordinal theory, and to describe it the cardinal point of view is demanded. In absence of cardinal formalization of basic axioms of the social choice theory it is offered new formal mathematical machinery. It is proved that cardinal voting can satisfy Pareto efficiency, independence of irrelevant alternative, unrestricted domain, and at the same time it can be nondictatorship in disproof of Arrow's impossibility theorem.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 6

Keywords: voting, social choice, ordinal theory, cardinal theory, Arrow's impossibility theorem

JEL Classification: D71

working papers series


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Date posted: April 6, 2008 ; Last revised: April 10, 2008

Suggested Citation

Vasiljev, Sergei, Cardinal Voting: The Way to Escape the Social Choice Impossibility (April 1, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1116545 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1116545

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