Cardinal Voting: The Way to Escape the Social Choice Impossibility
affiliation not provided to SSRN
April 1, 2008
In the article it is called the universality of the ordinal theory of social choice in question. It is shown that a voting exists that cannot be described on the base of ordinal theory, and to describe it the cardinal point of view is demanded. In absence of cardinal formalization of basic axioms of the social choice theory it is offered new formal mathematical machinery. It is proved that cardinal voting can satisfy Pareto efficiency, independence of irrelevant alternative, unrestricted domain, and at the same time it can be nondictatorship in disproof of Arrow's impossibility theorem.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 6
Keywords: voting, social choice, ordinal theory, cardinal theory, Arrow's impossibility theorem
JEL Classification: D71
Date posted: April 6, 2008 ; Last revised: April 10, 2008
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