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Civil Liberties, Democracy, and the Performance of Government Projects

Jonathan Isham
Middlebury College - Department of Economics

Daniel Kaufmann
The Brookings Institution

Lant Pritchett
Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government; Center for Global Development



World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 219-242, May 1997

Abstract:     
This article uses a cross-national data set on the performance of government investment projects financed by the World Bank to examine the link between government efficacy and governance. It demonstrates a strong empirical link between civil liberties and the performance of government projects. Even after controlling for other determinants of performance, countries with the strongest civil liberties have projects with an economic rate of return 8-22 percentage points higher than countries with the weakest civil liberties. The strong effect of civil liberties holds true even when controlling for the level of democracy. The interrelationship among civil liberties, civil strife, and project performance suggests that the possible mechanism of causation is from more civil liberties to increased citizen voice to better projects. This result adds to the evidence for the view that increasing citizen voice and public accountability - through both participation and better governance - can lead to greater efficacy in government action.

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: April 05, 2008 ; Last revised: April 05, 2008

Suggested Citation

Isham, Jonathan, Kaufmann, Daniel and Pritchett, Lant, Civil Liberties, Democracy, and the Performance of Government Projects. World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 219-242, May 1997. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1116669


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Contact Information

Daniel Kaufmann (Contact Author)
The Brookings Institution ( email )
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States
202-797-6257 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.thekaufmannpost.net
Jonathan Isham
Middlebury College - Department of Economics ( email )
Munroe Hall
Middlebury, VT 05753
United States
802-433-3238 (Phone)
Lant Pritchett
Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government ( email )
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-4562 (Phone)
617-496-2554 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~lpritch/
Center for Global Development
1800 Massachusetts Ave NW
Third Floor
Washington, DC 20036
United States
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