Regulating the Rulemakers: A Proposal for Deliberative Cost-Benefit Analysis
University of Chicago - Law School
Yale Law & Policy Review, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2008
Modern risks are increasingly complex. Experts provide sober insights into the consequences of our regulatory choices. But these same risks also breed greater uncertainties and, thus, harder political decisions. Ever more urgent, then, becomes the need to ensure those decisions are transparent and accountable. Accordingly, this Note proposes the idea of deliberative cost-benefit analysis as a new regulatory paradigm, and offers concrete suggestions for implementing it. Simply stated, deliberative cost-benefit analysis entails the use of deliberative forums at critical stages of a cost-benefit study, including the designation of discount rates and measurements of willingness-to-pay. The results of this method would constitute a more legitimate means of administrative decision-making. Deliberative cost-benefit analysis can also mitigate social choice problems, uninformed preferences, and current deficits in democratic scrutiny.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 44
Keywords: cost-benefit analysis, deliberative democracy, social choice, regulatory risks, citizens juries, deliberative polls
JEL Classification: A10, A11, A12, A13, A14, D70, D71, D72, D73, D78Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: April 8, 2008 ; Last revised: August 5, 2012
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