Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1117583
 
 

References (23)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Is the Coach Paid Too Much? Coaching Salaries and the NCAA Cartel


Amy Farmer


University of Arkansas - Department of Economics

Paul Pecorino


University of Alabama - Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies

March 1, 2008

U of Alabama, Economics, Finance and Legal Studies Working Paper No. 08-03-02

Abstract:     
Recently a great deal of controversy has been generated from the salaries earned by head football coaches in the NCAA. On one level this seems odd since many figures in the world of sports and entertainment earn exceptionally high salaries. However, one important difference in the case of NCAA football is that the players themselves do not get paid. We develop a model which shows that a cartel agreement to not pay the players raises the coach's salary if some players choose where to play based on the identity of the coach. For some parameters, the gain in the coach's salary exceeds the loss in salary experienced by the player. On average, the agreement not to pay the players improves competitive balance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: NCAA Cartel, Collusion, Labor Market, Monopsony

JEL Classification: C72, D2, J42

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: April 8, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Farmer, Amy and Pecorino, Paul, Is the Coach Paid Too Much? Coaching Salaries and the NCAA Cartel (March 1, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1117583 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1117583

Contact Information

Amy Farmer
University of Arkansas - Department of Economics ( email )
Fayetteville, AR 72701
United States
501-575-6093 (Phone)
501-575-3241 (Fax)
Paul Pecorino (Contact Author)
University of Alabama - Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies ( email )
P.O. Box 870244
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States
205-348-0379 (Phone)
205-348-0590 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,624
Downloads: 179
Download Rank: 93,215
References:  23
Citations:  1

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.500 seconds