Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1117628
 
 

Citations (1)



 
 

Footnotes (126)



 


 



Keeping Imports Safe: A Proposal for Discriminatory Regulation of International Trade


Kenneth A. Bamberger


University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

Andrew T. Guzman


University of California, Berkeley - School of Law


California Law Review, Vol. 96, p. 1405, 2008
UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1117628

Abstract:     
The benefits of overseas outsourcing have come at a cost. Americans enjoy unprecedented levels of safety and security in the domestically-produced goods they use, food and drugs they ingest, and services they employ. Yet as U.S. firms offer better price-quality combinations by contracting with foreign companies, the mix of economic, legal, and societal forces that serve to protect consumers changes. Though international trade in goods and services provides clear economic benefits, it can also frustrate consumer protection efforts.

This article provides a conceptual framework for understanding the mix of regulatory elements that govern domestic production of goods and services, and the ways in which international trade changes that mix. It distinguishes between two types of domestic regulation - the first targeting the process by which goods are produced and services provided, and the second mandating particular outcomes. Foreign production disables the first type of regulation and weakens the second. Protecting domestic consumers in a globalized market, then, will frequently require the development of "substitutes" - including regulation by foreign governments and private regulators - for domestic forms of governance that are ineffective abroad.

To address the threat posed by foreign production, we propose that the best "substitute" for domestic regulation will often be oversight of safety issues by U.S. partners in global trade. To provide incentives to domestic firms, U.S. regulators should make those firms legally accountable for harmful products that make it to the United States. Furthermore, regulators should impose higher penalties for violations of safety norms when production has taken place abroad.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: imports, safety, international trade, regualtion, international law

JEL Classification: K33

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: April 9, 2008 ; Last revised: February 24, 2009

Suggested Citation

Bamberger, Kenneth A. and Guzman, Andrew T., Keeping Imports Safe: A Proposal for Discriminatory Regulation of International Trade. California Law Review, Vol. 96, p. 1405, 2008; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1117628. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1117628

Contact Information

Kenneth A. Bamberger (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )
Boalt Hall NA446
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
(510) 643-6218 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/profiles/facultyProfile.php?facID=5701
Andrew T. Guzman
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )
Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
510-642-8074 (Phone)
510-642-3728 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.andrewguzman.net
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,068
Downloads: 222
Download Rank: 75,839
Citations:  1
Footnotes:  126

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.484 seconds