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Collateral Spread and Financial Development


Jose Maria Liberti


DePaul University

Atif R. Mian


Princeton University - Department of Economics; Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs; NBER



Abstract:     
We show that institutions that promotional development ease borrowing constraints by lowering the collateral spread, and shifting the composition of acceptable collateral towards firm-specific assets. Using a novel cross-country loan-level data set, we estimate collateral spread as the difference in rates of collateralization between high and low risk borrowers in a given economy. The average collateral spread is large but declines rapidly with financial development. A one standard deviation improvement in financial development due to stronger institutions leads to a reduction in collateral spread by one-half. We also find that the composition of collateralizable assets shifts towards non-specific assets (e.g. land) with increased risk. However, this shift is considerably smaller in more developed financial markets, thus enabling risky borrowers to use a larger variety of assets as collateral.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: collateral, financial development, banks, emerging markets

JEL Classification: G21, G33, K11, K12, O12

working papers series


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Date posted: April 8, 2008 ; Last revised: April 3, 2009

Suggested Citation

Liberti, Jose Maria and Mian, Atif R., Collateral Spread and Financial Development. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1117738 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1117738

Contact Information

Jose Maria Liberti (Contact Author)
DePaul University ( email )
1 East Jackson Blvd.
Chicago, IL 60604-2287
United States
(312) 362-8739 (Phone)
(312) 362-6566 (Fax)
Atif R. Mian
Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States
Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs ( email )
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States
NBER
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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