Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1118330
 
 

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A Model of Vertical Oligopolistic Competition


Markus Reisinger


WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Monika Schnitzer


University of Munich - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

February 2008


Abstract:     
This paper develops a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous market entry, allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets. Our analysis shows that the downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two-tier structure while the upstream conditions mainly affect the distribution of profits. We compare the welfare effects of upstream versus downstream deregulation policies and show that the impact of deregulation may be overvalued when ignoring feedback effects from the other market. Furthermore, we analyze how different forms of vertical restraints influence the endogenous market structure and show when they are welfare enhancing.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: Deregulation, Free Entry, Price Competition, Product Differentiation, Successive Olipopolies, Two-Part Tariffs, Vertical Restraints

JEL Classification: L13, D43, L40, L50

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Date posted: April 9, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Reisinger, Markus and Schnitzer, Monika, A Model of Vertical Oligopolistic Competition (February 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1118330 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1118330

Contact Information

Markus Reisinger (Contact Author)
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )
Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany
00 49 261 6509 290 (Phone)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Monika Schnitzer
University of Munich - Department of Economics ( email )
Ludwigstrasse 28
Munich, D-80539
Germany
+49 89 2180 2217 (Phone)
+49 89 2180 2767 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
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