Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121441
 
 

Footnotes (96)



 


 



Political Economy of Criminal Procedure


Keith N. Hylton


Boston University - School of Law

Vikramaditya S. Khanna


University of Michigan Law School


Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 08-16

Abstract:     
This chapter presents a public choice theory of criminal procedure. The core idea is that criminal procedure is best understood as a set of rules designed to thwart attempts to use the state's law enforcement power in a predatory fashion or in order to transfer wealth generally. For the most part we focus on a set of core procedural protections that can be considered long-established norms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: public choice, rent seeking, criminal procedure theory, reasonable doubt standard, double jeopardy, ex post facto clause, due process, error costs, selective enforcement, cruel and unusual punishment

JEL Classification: K00, K14, K19, K39, K49

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: April 17, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N. and Khanna, Vikramaditya S., Political Economy of Criminal Procedure. Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 08-16. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121441 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1121441

Contact Information

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)
Boston University - School of Law ( email )
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)
Vikramaditya S. Khanna
University of Michigan Law School ( email )
625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States
734-615-6959 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 998
Downloads: 179
Download Rank: 101,350
Footnotes:  96

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.281 seconds