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Political Economy of Criminal ProcedureKeith N. HyltonBoston University Vikramaditya S. KhannaUniversity of Michigan Law School Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 08-16 Abstract: This chapter presents a public choice theory of criminal procedure. The core idea is that criminal procedure is best understood as a set of rules designed to thwart attempts to use the state's law enforcement power in a predatory fashion or in order to transfer wealth generally. For the most part we focus on a set of core procedural protections that can be considered long-established norms.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36 Keywords: public choice, rent seeking, criminal procedure theory, reasonable doubt standard, double jeopardy, ex post facto clause, due process, error costs, selective enforcement, cruel and unusual punishment JEL Classification: K00, K14, K19, K39, K49 working papers seriesDate posted: April 17, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
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