Political Economy of Criminal Procedure
Keith N. Hylton
William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University; Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law
Vikramaditya S. Khanna
University of Michigan Law School
Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 08-16
This chapter presents a public choice theory of criminal procedure. The core idea is that criminal procedure is best understood as a set of rules designed to thwart attempts to use the state's law enforcement power in a predatory fashion or in order to transfer wealth generally. For the most part we focus on a set of core procedural protections that can be considered long-established norms.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36
Keywords: public choice, rent seeking, criminal procedure theory, reasonable doubt standard, double jeopardy, ex post facto clause, due process, error costs, selective enforcement, cruel and unusual punishment
JEL Classification: K00, K14, K19, K39, K49working papers series
Date posted: April 17, 2008
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.328 seconds