Efficiency and the Provision of Open Platforms
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
IFN Working Paper No. 748
Private firms may not have efficient incentives to allow third-party producers to access their platform or develop extensions for their products. Based on a two-sided market model, I discuss two reasons for why. First, a private firm may not be able to internalize all benefits from cross-group externalities arising with third-party extensions. Second, firms may have strategic incentives to shut out third-parties because it relaxes competition.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 17
Keywords: Platforms, Two-sided Markets, Open versus Closed
JEL Classification: D40, L10working papers series
Date posted: April 29, 2008
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