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In Defense of Credit Default Swaps

Charles Davi
New York University - School of Law


04/29/2008


Abstract:     
This paper is for the most part a refutation of the works of Hu and Black on the incentives created by credit default swaps in the bankruptcy context. We show that Hu and Black's concerns over empty voting and negative economic interest in the bankruptcy context are entirely without merit.

Keywords: Credit Default Swap, Bankruptcy, Hu, Black

JEL Classifications: G30

Working Paper Series

Date posted: April 30, 2008 ; Last revised: April 30, 2008

Suggested Citation

Davi, Charles, In Defense of Credit Default Swaps (04/29/2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1126732


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Contact Information

Charles Davi (Contact Author)
New York University - School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
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