Footnotes (25)



In Defense of Credit Default Swaps

Charles Davi

New York University School of Law


This paper is for the most part a refutation of the works of Hu and Black on the incentives created by credit default swaps in the bankruptcy context. We show that Hu and Black's concerns over empty voting and negative economic interest in the bankruptcy context are entirely without merit.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10

Keywords: Credit Default Swap, Bankruptcy, Hu, Black

JEL Classification: G30

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Date posted: April 30, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Davi, Charles, In Defense of Credit Default Swaps (04/29/2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1126732 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1126732

Contact Information

Charles Davi (Contact Author)
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
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