Footnotes (287)



Economic Foundations of Competition Laws: The Benefits of Monopoly vs. the Benefits of Competition

Alfonso Miranda Londoño

Pontificia Universidad Javeriana

Juan D. Gutiérrez R.

Pontificia Universidad Javeriana

May 2008

Antitrust Law can be described as the set of legal rules that regulate the current or potential power of the companies on a certain market, on behalf of public interest. In practice, the Antitrust Law prohibits the execution of restrictive competition practices, the acquisition of a dominant position in the market through the accomplishment of these practices and the abuse of the dominant position.

This document is an approach to the analysis of one of the fundamental premises of this discipline, which states that the markets in competition produce greater benefits to society than the markets with monopolistic structures. In this order, we will analyze the origins, evolution and purpose of the Antitrust Law, the practical difficulties that the competition authorities must face 'particularly the Latin American authorities', and also the criticisms that have been formulated against the laws that develop Antitrust. For this is purpose the following subjects are exposed: 1) Origins and evolution of the Antitrust Law in the United States of America, the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean. 2) Economic Aspects of the Antitrust Law 3) Competitive markets and monopolistic markets. 4) Criticisms to the Antitrust Law 5) The challenges for the Latin American competition authorities.

Note: Downloadable document is in Spanish.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 132

Keywords: Antitrust Law, monopolies, imperfect markets, restrictive practices and mergers & acquisitions

JEL Classification: K21

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: May 7, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Miranda Londoño, Alfonso and Gutiérrez R., Juan D., Economic Foundations of Competition Laws: The Benefits of Monopoly vs. the Benefits of Competition (May 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1126903 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1126903

Contact Information

Alfonso Miranda Londoño (Contact Author)
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana ( email )
3122900 (Phone)
3104715 (Fax)
Juan David Gutiérrez
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana ( email )
Carrera 7 No. 40-62
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,561
Downloads: 633
Download Rank: 24,519
Footnotes:  287

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.265 seconds