Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India
Timothy J. Besley
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)
World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)
LSE STICERD Research Paper No. DEDPS49
This paper uses data on elected village councils in South India to examine the political economy of public resource allocation. We find that the pattern of policy-making reflects politicians' self-interest. Elected councillors benefit from improved personal access to public resources. In addition, the head councillor's group identity and residence influences public resource allocation. While electoral incentives do not eliminate politician opportunism, voters appear able to use their electoral clout to gain greater access to public resources.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 43
JEL Classification: H76, H11, O12working papers series
Date posted: April 30, 2008
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