Capital Market Competitiveness and Enforcement
Eilis Ferran
University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
April 2008
Abstract:
Recent scholarship has suggested that enforcement intensity may impinge significantly on capital market competitiveness. This paper examines this proposition in the context of the UK FSA's approach to oversight and enforcement in respect of insider dealing and other forms of market abuse.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 10
Keywords: capital markets, competitiveness; insider dealing; market abuse; UK public enforcement
JEL Classification: G18, G28, G38, K22
working papers series
Suggested Citation
Ferran, Eilis, Capital Market Competitiveness and Enforcement (April 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1127245 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1127245
