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Club Deals in Leveraged Buyouts
Micah S. Officer Loyola Marymount University - Department of Finance and Computer Information Systems Oguzhan Ozbas University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department Berk A. Sensoy Fisher College of Business - Ohio State University October 28, 2008 Marshall School of Business Working Paper No. MKT 10-08 Abstract: We analyze the pricing and characteristics of club deal leveraged buyouts (LBOs) - those in which two or more private equity partnerships jointly conduct an LBO. We find that target shareholders receive approximately 10% less in club deals than in sole-sponsor LBOs. These results are robust to numerous controls for target and deal characteristics, including size, Q, and measures of risk, as well as time and industry fixed effects. The results are stronger before 2006, when club deals began to receive heightened media and government scrutiny. High institutional ownership in the target firm mitigates the club deal effect, suggesting that sophisticated institutional investors are able to bargain effectively with clubs. We find little to no support for benign motivations for club deals based on capital constraints, diversification motives, or the ability of clubs to obtain favorable debt amounts or prices. Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that club deals are detrimental to passive, dispersed shareholders of publicly-traded corporations, especially before 2006. Working Paper Series Date posted: May 05, 2008 ; Last revised: October 30, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
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