Doctrinal Cross-Dressing in Derivative Aftermarkets: Kodak, Xerox and the Copycat Game

Peritz, Rudolph J.R.

Abstract

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Doctrinal Cross-Dressing in Derivative Aftermarkets: Kodak, Xerox and the Copycat Game

Rudolph J.R. Peritz

New York Law School

Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 51, p. 287
NYLS Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07/08-24

Abstract:
The short essay develops the concept of strategic parallel conduct by filling the old bottle of interdependent conscious parallelism with the new wine of game theory. The conduct underlying the Kodak and Xerox cases is taken as the example of a positive sum game that is better understood and more appropriately litigated under Sherman Act Section One as strategic parallel conduct than under Section Two as monopolization or attempts to monopolize.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 9

Keywords: antitrust, parallel conduct, aftermarkets, game theory, complexity theory

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Date posted: May 7, 2008 ; Last revised: June 1, 2008

Suggested Citation

Peritz, Rudolph J.R., Doctrinal Cross-Dressing in Derivative Aftermarkets: Kodak, Xerox and the Copycat Game. Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 51, p. 287; NYLS Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07/08-24. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1129913

Contact Information

Rudolph J.R. Peritz (Contact Author)

New York Law School ( email )

185 West Broadway
New York, NY 10013
United States