Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1132082
 
 

References (137)



 
 

Citations (78)



 


 



Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice


Bernard S. Black


Northwestern University - School of Law; Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

1992

UCLA Law Review, Vol. 39, pp. 811-893, 1992

Abstract:     
This article discusses the potential promise and limits of oversight of corporate managers by major institutional investors. I discuss the reasons to believe that, at least for systemic issues that arise at many firms, there can be value is assigning one set of loosely watched agents (institutional money managers) to watch another set (corporate managers). This is partly because, as long as it takes a number of institutions to strongly influence corporate actions, the institutions can also watch each other, thus reducing the risk that any one of them will extract private benefits from the firm. The case for shared institutional voice (with six or ten institutions, often different types of institutions, exercising joint influence) is stronger than the case for direct institutional control of a firm by a particular institution.

In a companion paper, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 39, pp. 895-939 (1992), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1132063, I survey the empirical evidence on the value of large shareholder oversight of managers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 84

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Date posted: May 14, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Black, Bernard S., Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice (1992). UCLA Law Review, Vol. 39, pp. 811-893, 1992. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1132082

Contact Information

Bernard S. Black (Contact Author)
Northwestern University - School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Unit 1505
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
512-503-2784 (Phone)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-5049 (Phone)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Brussels
Belgium
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