Corporate Restructuring: Breakups and LBOs

Abstract:     
This essay surveys the empirical literature on corporate breakup transactions (divestitures, spinoffs, equity carveouts, tracking stocks), leveraged recapitalizations, and leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Many breakup transactions are a response to excessive conglomeration and reverse costly diversification discounts. The empirical evidence shows that the typical restructuring creates substantial value for shareholders. The value-drivers include elimination of costly cross-subsidizations characterizing internal capital markets, reduction in financing costs for subsidiaries through asset securitization and increased divisional transparency, improved (and more focused) investment programs, reduction in agency costs of free cash flow, implementation of executive compensation schemes with greater pay-performance sensitivity, and increased monitoring by lenders and LBO sponsors. Buyouts after the turn of the century create value similar to LBOs of the 1980s. Recent developments include club deals (consortiums of LBO sponsors bidding together), fund-to-fund exits (LBO funds selling the portfolio firm to another LBO fund), a highly liquid (until mid-2007) leveraged loan market, and evidence of persistence in fund returns (perhaps because brand-sponsors borrow at better rates). The perhaps greatest challenge to the restructuring literature is to achieve a modicum of integration of the analysis across transaction types. Another challenge is to produce precise estimates of the expected return from buyout investments in the presence of limited data on those portfolio companies which do not return to public status.

Keywords: Restructuring, breakup, divestiture, spinoff, equity carveout, tracking stock, leveraged

JEL Classifications: G32, G34

Accepted Paper Series