The Joint Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection: A First Pass
Olivier J. Blanchard
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); International Monetary Fund (IMF)
University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI); University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6127
Unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation. ln this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design in a simple model, with risk averse workers, risk neutral firms, and random shocks to productivity. We show that, in the 'first best', unemployment insurance comes with employment protection - in the form of layoff taxes; indeed, optimality requires that layoff taxes be equal to unemployment benefits. We then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations from first best: limits on insurance, limits on layoff taxes, ex-post wage bargaining, and ex-ante heterogeneity of firms or workers. We show how the design must be modified in each case. Finally, we draw out the implications of our analysis for current policy debates and reform proposals, from the financing of unemployment insurance, to the respective roles of severance payments and unemployment benefits.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 39
Keywords: Employment protection, experience rating, layoff taxes, layoffs, severance payments, unemployment benefits, unemployment insurance
JEL Classification: D60, E62, H21, J30, J32, J38, J65working papers series
Date posted: May 19, 2008
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