European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO)
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6163
In this paper, we study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by a party who faces competition for political talent from the lobbying sector. We show that a political party may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that it could afford to recruit better individuals who would like to become politicians. We argue that this finding may contribute to explain the observation that in many countries the political class is mostly composed of mediocre people.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 23
Keywords: Parties, political recruitment, politicians
JEL Classification: D72, J44, J45
Date posted: May 19, 2008
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