Mediocracy

23 Pages Posted: 19 May 2008

See all articles by Andrea Mattozzi

Andrea Mattozzi

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Antonio Merlo

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; Rice University

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2007

Abstract

In this paper, we study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by a party who faces competition for political talent from the lobbying sector. We show that a political party may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that it could afford to recruit better individuals who would like to become politicians. We argue that this finding may contribute to explain the observation that in many countries the political class is mostly composed of mediocre people.

Keywords: Parties, political recruitment, politicians

JEL Classification: D72, J44, J45

Suggested Citation

Mattozzi, Andrea and Merlo, Antonio M., Mediocracy (March 2007). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6163, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1133807

Andrea Mattozzi (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Bologna
Italy

Antonio M. Merlo

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7933 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~merloa

Rice University ( email )

6100 South Main Street
Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States