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Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow Short Term?


Fernando A. Broner


CREI; Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Barcelona GSE; CEPR

Guido Lorenzoni


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Sergio L. Schmukler


World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

April 2007

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6249

Abstract:     
We argue that emerging economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium charged by bondholders on long-term debt. First, we present a model where the debt maturity structure is the outcome of a risk sharing problem between the government and bondholders. By issuing long-term debt, the government lowers the probability of a rollover crisis, transferring risk to bondholders. In equilibrium, this risk is reflected in a higher risk premium and borrowing cost. Therefore, the government faces a trade-off between safer long-term debt and cheaper short-term debt. Second, we construct a new database of sovereign bond prices and issuance. We show that emerging economies pay a positive term premium (a higher risk premium on long-term bonds than on short-term bonds). During crises, the term premium increases, with issuance shifting towards shorter maturities. The evidence suggests that international investors' time-varying risk aversion is crucial to understand the debt structure in emerging economies.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 67

Keywords: emerging market debt, financial crises, investor risk aversion, maturity structure, risk premium, term premium

JEL Classification: E43, F30, F32, F34, F36, G15

working papers series


Date posted: May 21, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Broner, Fernando A., Lorenzoni, Guido and Schmukler, Sergio L., Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow Short Term? (April 2007). , Vol. , pp. -, 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1135487

Contact Information

Fernando A. Broner (Contact Author)
CREI ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
08005 Barcelona, Catalonia
Spain
+34 93 542 2601 (Phone)
+34 93 542 1860 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.crei.cat/people/broner
Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
08005 Barcelona, Catalonia
Spain
+34 93 542 2601 (Phone)
+34 93 542 1860 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.crei.cat/people/broner
Barcelona GSE ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, Catalonia 08014
Spain
+34 93 542 2601 (Phone)
CEPR ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
+34 93 542 2601 (Phone)
+34 93 542 1860 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.crei.cat/people/broner
Guido Lorenzoni
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )
50 Memorial Drive
E52-251c
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Sergio Schmukler
World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )
1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-458-4167 (Phone)
202-522-3518 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/sschmukler
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