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The Use of Settlements in Public Antitrust Enforcement: Objectives and Principles

Wouter P. J. Wils
European Commission Legal Service; King's College London - School of Law



World Competition: Law and Economics Review, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2008

Abstract:     
This paper discusses two general questions concerning the use of settlements in public antitrust enforcement, namely under which conditions the use of settlements contributes to optimal antitrust enforcement, and under which conditions self-incrimination and waivers of procedural rights by settlement candidates are compatible with fundamental rights of defence. The discussion of these general questions will be illustrated with the specific example of the two settlement procedures for the enforcement by the European Commission of the antitrust prohibitions contained in Articles 81 and 82 EC, namely the commitment procedure under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, and the new settlement procedure in cartel cases.

Keywords: antitrust, enforcement, plea bargaining, settlement, deterrence, rights of the defence

JEL Classifications: K14, K21, K42, L40

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: May 21, 2008 ; Last revised: July 17, 2008

Suggested Citation

Wils, Wouter P. J., The Use of Settlements in Public Antitrust Enforcement: Objectives and Principles. World Competition: Law and Economics Review, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1135627


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Contact Information

Wouter P. J. Wils (Contact Author)
European Commission Legal Service ( email )
B-1049 Brussels Belgium
King's College London - School of Law
London WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom
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