Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1136870
 
 

References (36)



 
 

Citations (7)



 


 



When do Legislators Pass on Pork? The Role of Political Parties in Determining Legislator Effort


Philip Keefer


World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Stuti Khemani


World Bank; World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)



Abstract:     
A central challenge in political economy is to identify the conditions under which legislators seek to bring home the pork to constituents. We conduct the first systematic analysis of one determinant of constituency service, voter attachment to political parties, holding constant electoral and political institutions. Our analysis takes advantage of data from a unique type of public spending program that is proliferating across developing countries, the constituency development fund (CDF), which offers more precise measures of legislator effort than are common in the literature. Examining the CDF in India, we find that legislator effort is significantly lower in constituencies that are party strongholds. This result, which is robust to controls for alternate explanations, implies that legislators pass on pork when voters are more attached to political parties. It has implications not only for understanding political incentives and the dynamics of party formation, but also for evaluating the impact of CDFs.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: political parties, constituency service, pork barrel, affirmative action, institutions, elections, legislator effort

JEL Classification: D72, D78, H42

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: May 26, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Keefer, Philip and Khemani, Stuti, When do Legislators Pass on Pork? The Role of Political Parties in Determining Legislator Effort. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1136870 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1136870

Contact Information

Philip Keefer (Contact Author)
World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )
1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-458-2479 (Phone)
202-522-1155 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/pkeefer
Stuti Khemani
World Bank ( email )
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States
HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/skhemani
World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)
1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 772
Downloads: 109
Download Rank: 146,413
References:  36
Citations:  7

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.234 seconds