Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=11369
 


 



Strategic Instruments: Politics and Decision Costs in Administrative and Judicial Process


Emerson H. Tiller


Northwestern University - School of Law

Pablo T. Spiller


University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

September 1997


Abstract:     
In this paper, the authors develop a formal model of strategic interaction between federal regulatory agencies, appellate courts and the Supreme Court. The focus of the paper is on the ability of actors on the lower end of the review hierarchy (agencies and appellate court panels) to impose decision making costs on higher levels of review (appellate courts and the Supreme Court) by selecting the grounds (or "instruments") on which they base their decision. For agencies, the choice of instruments may be rulemaking vs. adjudication. For appellate courts, the choice to overturn an agency may be based on process vs. statutory interpretation. Certain instruments are more difficult for higher courts to review than others. Because higher level actors are resource constrained, they tend to defer to lower level decision makers more often if a high cost review instrument is involved. This allows for strategic behavior by the lower level actors.

working papers series


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Date posted: September 19, 1997  

Suggested Citation

Tiller, Emerson H. and Spiller, Pablo T., Strategic Instruments: Politics and Decision Costs in Administrative and Judicial Process (September 1997). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=11369

Contact Information

Emerson H. Tiller (Contact Author)
Northwestern University - School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Unit 1505
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
Pablo T. Spiller
University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group ( email )
545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-1502 (Phone)
510-642-2826 (Fax)
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