Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy
Harvard Law School
July 3, 2009
Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 76, 2009
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 613
Disgorgement of illicitly-gained profits is a legally available remedy, but is rarely sought by antitrust agencies. This piece argues that the main conventional explanation for its rare usage - the availability of private damage remedies - is often unconvincing given obstacles to such suits, and is becoming even less convincing given recent antitrust decisions narrowing private and class action damage suits. Further, because the behavioral and structural remedies otherwise sought by the government are often ineffective in monopolization cases, disgorgement might often be a referable governmental remedy. Finally, if we understood the EC claim for excessive pricing to be a claim for disgorgement of profits earned through the anticompetitive acquisition of a dominant position, we could both make better policy sense of that claim and fill a regulatory gap that EC law would otherwise leave for exclusionary conduct that created a dominant position, but did not abuse existing dominance.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 18
Keywords: antitrust, competition law, monopolization, abuse of dominance, disgorgement, antitrust remedies, structural remedies, behavior remedies, equitable remedies, equitable monetary remedies, equitable monetary relief, FTC, DOJ, Microsoft, class action, excessive pricing
JEL Classification: K00, K10, K20, K21, K40, K41, K42, K49, L00, L10working papers series
Date posted: May 26, 2008 ; Last revised: July 6, 2009
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