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When are Auctions Best?


Jeremy Bulow


Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Paul Klemperer


University of Oxford - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

July 2007

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6393

Abstract:     
We compare the two most common bidding processes for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly to buyers. In an auction all entry decisions are made prior to any bidding. In a sequential bidding process earlier entrants can make bids before later entrants choose whether to compete. The sequential process is more efficient because entrants base their decisions on superior information. But pre-emptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers. Because the auction is more conducive to entry in several ways it usually generates higher expected revenue.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: Auctions, Entry, Jump Bidding, Procurement, Sequential Sales

JEL Classification: D44, G34, L13

working papers series


Date posted: May 29, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Bulow, Jeremy and Klemperer, Paul, When are Auctions Best? (July 2007). , Vol. , pp. -, 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1137074

Contact Information

Jeremy I. Bulow (Contact Author)
Stanford University ( email )
Room L 237
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-2160 (Phone)
650-725-0468 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics ( email )
Manor Road Building
Manor Road
Oxford, OX1 3BJ
United Kingdom
+44 1865 278 588 (Phone)
+44 1865 278 557 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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