Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1137090
 
 

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The Corporate Governance of Benedictine Abbeys: What can Stock Corporations Learn from Monasteries?


Katja Rost


University of Zurich - Institute for Organization and Administrative Science

Emil Inauen


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Margit Osterloh


Professor of Management Science; Professor (em.) University of Zurich

Bruno S. Frey


CREMA; Zeppelin University



Abstract:     
The corporate governance structure of monasteries is analyzed to derive new insights into solving agency problems of modern corporations. In the long history of monasteries, some abbots and monks lined their own pockets and monasteries were undisciplined. Monasteries developed special systems to check these excesses and therefore were able to survive for centuries. These features are studied from an economic perspective. Benedictine monasteries in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and German speaking Switzerland have an average lifetime of almost 500 years and only a quarter of them broke up as a result of agency problems. We argue that this is due to an appropriate governance structure, relying strongly on the intrinsic motivation of the members and on internal control mechanisms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Principal-Agency-Theory, Psychological Economics, Monasteries, Benedictine Order

JEL Classification: D73, G3, L14, Z12

working papers series





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Date posted: May 25, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Rost, Katja and Inauen, Emil and Osterloh, Margit and Frey, Bruno S., The Corporate Governance of Benedictine Abbeys: What can Stock Corporations Learn from Monasteries?. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1137090 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1137090

Contact Information

Katja Rost
University of Zurich - Institute for Organization and Administrative Science ( email )
Plattenstrasse 14
CH-8032 Zurich
Switzerland
Emil Inauen
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Margit Osterloh (Contact Author)
Professor of Management Science ( email )
Gibbet Hill Rd.
Coventry, West Midlands CV4 8UW
United Kingdom
Professor (em.) University of Zurich ( email )
Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland
Bruno S. Frey
CREMA ( email )
Südstrasse 11
Zurich, CH 8008
Switzerland
Zeppelin University ( email )
Am Seemooser Horn 20
Friedrichshafen, Lake Constance 88045
Germany
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