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The Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence from a Natural Experiment


Francesco Drago


University of Naples Federico II

Roberto Galbiati


CNRS (umr EconomiX) Paris; Bocconi University - Department of Economics

Pietro Vertova


Bocconi University

July 2007

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6401

Abstract:     
In this paper we test for the theory of deterrence. We exploit the natural experiment provided by the Collective Clemency Bill passed by the Italian Parliament in July 2006. As a consequence of the provisions of the bill, expected punishment to former inmates recommitting a crime can be considered as good as randomly assigned. Based on a unique data set on post-release behaviour of former inmates, we find that an additional month in expected sentence reduces the propensity to recommit a crime by 1.24 percent: this corroborates the general deterrence hypothesis. However, this effect depends on the time previously served in prison: the behavioural response to an additional month of expected sentence decreases with the length of the prison spell. This second result can be hardly reconciled with the specific deterrence hypothesis according to which a stronger past experience of punishment should increase the sensitivity to future expected sanctions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Keywords: crime, deterrence, natural experiment, recidivism

JEL Classification: K42

working papers series


Date posted: May 29, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Drago, Francesco, Galbiati, Roberto and Vertova, Pietro, The Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (July 2007). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6401. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138514

Contact Information

Francesco Drago (Contact Author)
University of Naples Federico II ( email )
via Medina 40
Naples
Italy
Roberto Galbiati
CNRS (umr EconomiX) Paris ( email )
200 Avenue de la République
Nanterre cedex, Nanterre Cedex 92000
France
Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )
Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy
Pietro Vertova
Bocconi University ( email )
Via Sarfatti, 25
Milan, MI 20136
Italy
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