Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138682
 
 

References (100)



 
 

Citations (11)



 


 



Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey


Oliver Budzinski


Ilmenau University of Technology

Isabel Ruhmer


University of Mannheim - Center for Doctoral Studies in Economics and Management (CDSEM)

May 29, 2008


Abstract:     
Advances in competition economics as well as in computational and empirical methods have offered the scope for the employment of merger simulation models in merger control procedures during the past almost 15 years. Merger simulation is, nevertheless, still a very young and innovative instrument of antitrust and, therefore, its "technical" potential is far from being comprehensively exploited and teething problems in its practical use in the antitrust environment prevail. We provide a classification of state-of-the-art merger simulation models and review their previous employment in merger cases as well as the problems and limitations currently associated with their use in merger control. In summary, merger simulation models represent an important and valuable extension of the toolbox of merger policy. However, they do not qualify as a magic bullet and must be combined with other, more traditional instruments of competition policy in order to comprehensively unfold its beneficial effects.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: merger simulation, merger control, antitrust, oligopoly theory, auction models, mergers & acquisitions

JEL Classification: L40, C15, K21

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: June 2, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Budzinski, Oliver and Ruhmer, Isabel, Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey (May 29, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138682 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1138682

Contact Information

Oliver Budzinski (Contact Author)
Ilmenau University of Technology ( email )
Ilmenau, D-98684
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.tu-ilmenau.de/wth
Isabel Ruhmer
University of Mannheim - Center for Doctoral Studies in Economics and Management (CDSEM) ( email )
Mannheim, D-68131
Germany
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,690
Downloads: 716
Download Rank: 17,613
References:  100
Citations:  11
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.297 seconds