The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited
University of Granada - Departamento de Teoria e Historia Económica
University of Granada - Campus La Cartuja
Bar Ilan University - Department of Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6666
This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations).
Number of Pages in PDF File: 17
Keywords: carrot/stick, Economics of Religion, high stakes, punishment, rewards
JEL Classification: C91, D64, Z13working papers series
Date posted: June 9, 2008
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