Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=11413
 


 



The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics


Paul H. Edelman


Vanderbilt University - Law School

James Ming Chen


Michigan State University - College of Law


Southern California Law Review, Vol. 70, p. 63, 1996

Abstract:     
We analyze the relative voting power of the Justices based upon Supreme Court decisions during October Term 1994 and October Term 1995. We take two approaches, both based on ideas derived from cooperative game theory. One of the measures we use has been used in connection with voting rights cases. After naming the Most Dangerous Justice, we conclude by identifying and explaining the inverse relationship between seniority and voting power.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: Shapley-Shubik index, Frank-Shapley index, Banzhaf index, voting power, Supreme Court

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Date posted: October 17, 1997  

Suggested Citation

Edelman, Paul H. and Chen, James Ming, The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics. Southern California Law Review, Vol. 70, p. 63, 1996. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=11413

Contact Information

Paul H. Edelman (Contact Author)
Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )
131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States
615-322-0990 (Phone)
615-322-6631 (Fax)
James Ming Chen
Michigan State University - College of Law ( email )
318 Law College Building
East Lansing, MI 48824-1300
United States
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