The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics
Paul H. Edelman
Vanderbilt University - Law School
James Ming Chen
University of Louisville - Louis D. Brandeis School of Law
Southern California Law Review, Vol. 70, p. 63, 1996
We analyze the relative voting power of the Justices based upon Supreme Court decisions during October Term 1994 and October Term 1995. We take two approaches, both based on ideas derived from cooperative game theory. One of the measures we use has been used in connection with voting rights cases. After naming the Most Dangerous Justice, we conclude by identifying and explaining the inverse relationship between seniority and voting power.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 50
Keywords: Shapley-Shubik index, Frank-Shapley index, Banzhaf index, voting power, Supreme CourtAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: October 17, 1997
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