Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=11415
 
 

Citations



 


 



Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative Process and Judicial Review


Pablo T. Spiller


University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Emerson H. Tiller


Northwestern University - School of Law


in the Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26, No. 6 (1997).

Abstract:     
The ability of Congress to structure the institutional costs of agency and judicial decision making gives it considerable control over regulatory policy. The authors analyze the role of decision costs through models of agency-court interaction and consider the ability of Congress to manipulate such costs for its own policy purposes. The authors explore the implications of these models by examining recent congressional efforts to change the decision cost structures of agencies and courts. In particular, the authors consider the so-called "Bumpers Amendments of the 1980s and, from the 1990s, the Republican-proposed imposition of cost-benefit analysis on agency decision making.

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: October 17, 1997  

Suggested Citation

Spiller, Pablo T. and Tiller, Emerson H., Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative Process and Judicial Review. in the Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26, No. 6 (1997).. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=11415

Contact Information

Pablo T. Spiller
University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group ( email )
545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-1502 (Phone)
510-642-2826 (Fax)
Emerson H. Tiller (Contact Author)
Northwestern University - School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Unit 1505
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
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