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Supreme Court Amicus Brief Regarding Wyeth V. Diana Levine


John Calfee


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Ernst R. Berndt


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Robert W. Hahn


University of Oxford, Smith School; Georgetown University

Tomas Philipson


University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Paul H. Rubin


Emory University - Department of Economics

W. Kip Viscusi


Vanderbilt University - Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Vanderbilt University - Department of Economics; Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management; Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics

June 2008

Reg-Markets Center Brief No. 08-01

Abstract:     
Prominent in arguments opposing preemption of state tort law liability for alleged inadequacies in prescription drug labeling is the argument that such liability can complement FDA regulation by improving on a regulatory scheme that fails to provide adequate deterrence against the marketing of unsafe or inadequately labeled drugs. The premise of this argument is faulty. Fundamental principles of economics and numerous studies of FDA drug regulation reveal that FDA in fact errs on the side of overregulation of prescription drugs. Product liability litigation focused solely on one side of the prescription drug public health equation leads to further distortions of the drug approval and labeling process and exacerbates FDA's inherent overly cautious approach. Preemption of state tort law where it conflicts with FDA requirements will minimize these distortions and thereby maximize public health.

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Date posted: June 11, 2008 ; Last revised: November 27, 2012

Suggested Citation

Calfee, John and Berndt, Ernst R. and Hahn, Robert W. and Philipson, Tomas and Rubin, Paul H. and Viscusi, W. Kip, Supreme Court Amicus Brief Regarding Wyeth V. Diana Levine (June 2008). Reg-Markets Center Brief No. 08-01. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1142997 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1142997

Contact Information

John Calfee (Contact Author)
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Ernst R. Berndt
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
Room E52-452
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-2665 (Phone)
617-258-6055 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Robert W. Hahn
University of Oxford, Smith School ( email )
Oxford
United Kingdom
Georgetown University
Georgetown Center for Business and Public Policy
Washington, DC 20057
United States
Tomas J. Philipson
University of Chicago ( email )
Graduate School of Business
1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, 60637
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Paul H. Rubin
Emory University - Department of Economics ( email )
1602 Fishburne Drive
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
404-931-0493 (Phone)
630-604-9609 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.emory.edu/Rubi.htm
W. Kip Viscusi
Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )
131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States
615-343-7715 (Phone)
615-322-5953 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/viscusi.htm
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Vanderbilt University - Department of Economics
Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States
(615) 343-7715 (Phone)
(615) 343-5953 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/viscusi.htm
Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management
401 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203
United States
(615) 343-7715 (Phone)
(615) 343-5953 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/viscusi.htm
Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics ( email )
Nashville, TN 37203
United States

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