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Supreme Court Amicus Brief Regarding Wyeth V. Diana LevineJohn Calfeeaffiliation not provided to SSRN Ernst R. BerndtMassachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Robert W. HahnUniversity of Oxford, Smith School; Georgetown University Tomas PhilipsonUniversity of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Paul H. RubinEmory University - Department of Economics W. Kip ViscusiVanderbilt University - Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Vanderbilt University - Department of Economics; Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management; Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics June 2008 Reg-Markets Center Brief No. 08-01 Abstract: Prominent in arguments opposing preemption of state tort law liability for alleged inadequacies in prescription drug labeling is the argument that such liability can complement FDA regulation by improving on a regulatory scheme that fails to provide adequate deterrence against the marketing of unsafe or inadequately labeled drugs. The premise of this argument is faulty. Fundamental principles of economics and numerous studies of FDA drug regulation reveal that FDA in fact errs on the side of overregulation of prescription drugs. Product liability litigation focused solely on one side of the prescription drug public health equation leads to further distortions of the drug approval and labeling process and exacerbates FDA's inherent overly cautious approach. Preemption of state tort law where it conflicts with FDA requirements will minimize these distortions and thereby maximize public health.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 28 working papers seriesDate posted: June 11, 2008 ; Last revised: November 27, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
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