Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1143546
 
 

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Worksharing: A Calibrated Model


Etienne Billette de Villemeur


University of Lille I - EQUIPPE

Helmuth Cremer


University of Toulouse (GREMAQ & IDEI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Francois Boldron


Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Bernard Roy


La Poste

June, 10 2008

Review of Network Economics, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 272-293, June 2008

Abstract:     
This paper studies the price structure in a postal sector with a monopolistic operator when customers can engage in worksharing. It presents simulation results obtained from an empirical model that is calibrated on data from the French postal sector. The optimal worksharing discount is significantly larger than the avoided costs. Consequently, the appropriate pricing structure differs markedly from the often recommended ECPR policy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22

Keywords: Postal sector, Worksharing, Calibration

JEL Classification: L51, L87, L32

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: June 12, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Billette de Villemeur, Etienne and Cremer, Helmuth and Boldron, Francois and Roy, Bernard, Worksharing: A Calibrated Model (June, 10 2008). Review of Network Economics, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 272-293, June 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1143546

Contact Information

Etienne Billette de Villemeur (Contact Author)
University of Lille I - EQUIPPE ( email )
Université Lille 1 Sciences et Technologies
Faculté des Sciences Economiques et Sociales
Villeneuve d'Ascq, 59655
France
Helmuth Cremer
University of Toulouse (GREMAQ & IDEI) ( email )
Toulouse, 31000
France
+33 1 6112 8606 (Phone)
+33 1 6112 8637 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Francois Boldron
Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) ( email )
34 Voie du Roman Pays
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, b-1348
Belgium
Bernard Roy
La Poste ( email )
France
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