Worksharing: A Calibrated Model
Etienne Billette de Villemeur
University of Lille I - EQUIPPE
University of Toulouse (GREMAQ & IDEI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
June, 10 2008
Review of Network Economics, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 272-293, June 2008
This paper studies the price structure in a postal sector with a monopolistic operator when customers can engage in worksharing. It presents simulation results obtained from an empirical model that is calibrated on data from the French postal sector. The optimal worksharing discount is significantly larger than the avoided costs. Consequently, the appropriate pricing structure differs markedly from the often recommended ECPR policy.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22
Keywords: Postal sector, Worksharing, Calibration
JEL Classification: L51, L87, L32Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: June 12, 2008
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