On the Benefits of Costly Voting
Penn State University
University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group
May 24, 2008
We study strategic voting in a Condorcet type model in which voters have identical preferences but differential information. Voters incur private costs of going to the polls and may abstain if they wish; hence voting is voluntary. We show that under majority rule with voluntary voting, it is an equilibrium to vote sincerely. Thus, in contrast to situations with compulsory voting, there is no conflict between strategic and sincere behavior. In large elections, the equilibrium is shown to be unique. Furthermore, participation rates are such that, in the limit, the correct candidate is elected with probability one. Finally, we show that in large elections, voluntary voting is welfare superior to compulsory voting.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36
Keywords: Voting, Majority Rule, Poisson Games
JEL Classification: D72working papers series
Date posted: June 12, 2008
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.453 seconds